Admissibility of Confessions in Trial of Criminal Cases by Shelton, Robert E.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 11 Article 4 
June 2021 
Admissibility of Confessions in Trial of Criminal Cases 
Robert E. Shelton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Shelton, Admissibility of Confessions in Trial of Criminal Cases, 24 Dicta 249 (1947). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Admissibility of Confessions in Trial of
Criminal Cases
By ROBERT E. SHELTON
United States Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma.
An address before the Annual Conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit, Denver, Colo, June 14, 1947.
The obtaining of confessions by third degree methods, such as torture,
trickery, physical abuses, et cetera, has long been condemned by Anglo-Amer-
ican jurisprudence. Our own United States Constitution established the
guarantees that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, and, generally, before McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, and Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, decided by the United
States Supreme Court on March 1, 1943, the test of the admissibility of a
confession was its voluntariness and where there was no dispute of the facts
surrounding the confession the court determined its voluntariness. On the
other hand, if there was a dispute the question was submitted to the jury
with instructions to disregard the confession if they were satisfied it was not
made voluntarily. (Wilson v. U. S., 162 U.S. 613; Pearlman v. U. S., 10
Fed. (2d) 460.)
The McNabb and Anderson decisions brought into the open a smolder-
ing debate between civil rights enthusiasts and efficient law enforcement
enthusiasts and with those decisions voluntariness was no longer the exclu-
sive test. These decisions modified the old general rule to the extent that
a confession must not only be voluntary but is inadmissible if obtained during
a period of illegal detention. And long and exhaustive interrogations are
criticized. These decisions put new life into what was the "prompt arraign-
ment statutes" (superseded by rule 5 of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure)
requiring the arresting officer promptly to produce the arrested for arraign-
ment, before a committing magistrate and condemned the practice of arrest-
ing officers in holding the arrested incommunicado for long periods of time
in order to obtain confessions by prolonged questioning.
Let's take a look at the McNabb and Anderson cases.
In the McNabb case, Alcohol Tax Unit agents, acting on reliable in-
formation, were lying in wait for several members of the McNabb family,
near a cemetery where it was understood the McNabbs were to sell some
nontaxpaid whiskey on that night. The officers hid near where the liquor
was concealed and while the cans containing the whiskey were being loaded
into a car, on a pre-arranged signal the officers came running out calling,
"All right, boys, federal officers," and the McNabbs took flight. One of the
officers named Leeper ran on into the cemetery and while there a shot was
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heard and the other officers going to Leeper, found him on the ground
fatally wounded and a few minutes later he died. About one or two o'clock
the same Thursday night federal officers took into custody Freeman, Raymond
and Emuil McNabb. Barney McNabb was arrested early the next morning.
Benjamin McNabb voluntarily surrendered Friday morning. Questioning
of all the defendants was continued intermittently until two o'clock Saturday
morning when the officers finally got all of the discrepancies straightened out,
and the challenged confessions.
The McNabbs had little education, had lived in the same community
all their lives, and were subjected to exhausting questioning by experienced
federal officers from Thursday to Saturday, without the aid of counsel and
friends and relatives and without arraignment.
These confessions constituted the crux of the government's case and the
convictions of second degree murder were set aside because they were obtained
through wilful disregard of the procedure enjoined by Congress with refer-
ence to arraignment, and in the language of the court, "to allow the con-
victions to stand would be making the courts themselves accomplices in wilful
disobedience of law."
In the Anderson case, the defendants were convicted in the trial court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee of conspiring to damage property owned
by the Tennessee Valley Authority. At the time the property was damaged
the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers was out on
strike against the Tennessee Copper Company's mines of Copperhill, Polk
County, Tennessee. The strike shut down the mines until special deputies
were brought in, at which time the mining operations were resumed. The
damage to the Tennessee Valley Authority property was the result of the dyna-
miting of four power lines from which the mining company obtained the
power for its mining. After the explosions the sheriff, on his own initiative,
began to take into custody strikers, including the eight defendants whom
he suspected of participating in the dynamiting. These arrests were made
without warrants. The men were not taken before any magistrate as required
by Tennessee law. Instead, they were taken to the company-owned Y.M.C.A.
building in Copperhill which was being used by the sheriff and his special
deputies as their headquarters. While the defendants and at least thirteen
others were thus held at the Y.M.C.A. building by state officers, they were
questioned by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents intermittently over a
period of six days during which time the defendants saw neither friends,
relatives, nor counsel. Incriminating statements of six of the prisoners were
the fruit of this interrogation, and the chief evidence used for conviction.
The convictions of all of the defendants were set aside by the United States
Supreme Court, following the rule of the McNabb decision which was decided
the same day.
Neither of these cases was reversed because the confessions were obtained
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in violation of the self-incriminating clause of our constitution, but each was
reversed because the confessions were obtained during a period of illegal
detention, caused by the officers' failure promptly to produce the defendants
before a magistrate. Naturally these decisions caused unrest among law
enforcement officers and have aroused general public discussion of the problem.
It is easily understandable why these decisions did cause unrest among
law enforcement officers since a large percentage of all criminal cases is based
upon confessions, and the trial courts, after those decisions, began to rule out
the confessions of arrested persons, even though voluntarily given and guilty
of the crime charged. Some of the decisions even went beyond the McNabb
rule and have attracted attention.
For instance, in U. S. v. Wilburn, No. 71877 and No. 72342 in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, the facts show that Wilburn, a
17-year-old negro, attacked one girl at about 7:00 a.m. on March 17, 1943,
and another girl at about 1:00 a.m. on March 18, 1943. He was arrested
at about 2:00 a.m. on the morning of March 18th and made a verbal con-
fession of the second attack at 4:00 a.m. At about 5:00 a.m. in the presence
of the complaining witness, he re-enacted the circumstances of the second
attack. He signed a written confession of both crimes at about 11:30 a.m.
March 18th and was arraigned in Juvenile Court about 3:00 p.m. the same
day. In the first case he was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape
and sentenced to imprisonment from six to nine years. However, Judge Letts
on July 2, 1943, citing the McNabb case, granted a new trial because of the
admission in evidence of the written confession. Thereafter, because of the
difficulty of proving the case without use of the confession, Wilburn was
allowed to plead guilty to simple assault and received a sentence of one year.
In the second case Judge Pine on November 15, 1943 directed a verdict of
acquittal, ruling that the government could not even introduce testimony
to the fact of the oral confession at 4:00 a.m. or the re-enactment of the
crime at about 5:00 a.m.
In U. S. v. Neely, another District of Columbia case, No. 72187, Neely
had been arrested about 5:00 p.m., Saturday, May 9th, and was taken before
a coroner's inquest at 11: 50 a.m., Monday, May 11 th. He had made a statement
about 8:00 p.m., Saturday evening. Judge Pine on November 18, 1943 ruled
such statement inadmissible even for the purpose of contradicting defendant
on his cross-examination.
In U. S. v. Basil Fedorka (Southern District of New York), Fedorka
had failed to report for induction after ordered by his draft board to do so,
and was apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at 7:00 a.m.,
May 14, 1943, and was taken to the offices of the bureau at the court house
at Foley Square, New York City. He was arraigned at 1:00 p.m. the same
day before the U. S. commissioner whose office was in the same building.
An attempt was made earlier to reach the U. S. commissioner who was absent
and his absence was the only reason for delay of the arraignment until 1:00
p.m. On July 19, 1943, Judge Caffey excluded both the written statement
and also testimony to oral admissions which Fedorka had made between the
time of arrest and time of arraignment. The case being a simple one in which
guilt was clear and easily proved, Fedorka was convicted without use of the
confessions and admissions.
In U. S. v. Stokeley Delmar Hart, (N. D. Ill.), a sedition case, Hart was
apprehended at 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, September 20, 1942, and gave a signed
statement at 5:00 p.m. that day. He was arraigned the next morning. At
the trial in May, 1943, Judge Igoe, in holding the statement inadmissible,
ruled that it made no difference that Hart had in fact been arraigned as soon
as the U. S. commissioner was available at his office.
In the meantime, however, the law enforcement agencies have received
some encouragement from the case of U. S. v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65, decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 24, 1944. Let's look
at the facts in that case.
Two houses in the District of Columbia were broken into and from each
property was stolen. The trail of the police investigation led to Mitchell who
was taken into custody at his home at 7:00 o'clock on the evening of October
12, 1942, and driven by two police officers to the precinct station. Within
a few minutes after arrival at the police station Mitchell admitted his guilt
and told officers of various items of stolen property at his home and consented
to their going to his home to recover the property. It was these admissions
and that property which supported the conviction and which were deemed
by the lower court under the McNabb case to have been inadmissible. After
these admissions by Mitchell the police held Mitchell in custody for eight
days without arraignment before a committing magistrate. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that the disclosures by
Mitchell were not induced by illegal detention and that his subsequent illegal
detention for eight days in no way nullified the voluntary confession made
by Mitchell.
Of interest also in this connection is the case of Ashcraft, et al. v. Ten-
nessee, decided by the U. S. Supreme Court February 25, 1946, being a
murder case which arose in the state court in which Ashcraft was charged
with the murder of his wife. Nine days after the murder Ashcraft was
taken into custody by state officers and held on the fifth floor of the county
jail without rest or sleep from Saturday at 7:00 p.m. until 7:00 o'clock the
following Monday morning, at which time he confessed, or thirty-six hours
during which time he was subjected to a constant barrage of questions and
charges. This confession was admitted in evidence by the trial court and
appeal was taken through the various courts to the United ,States Supreme
Court where the case was reversed on the grounds that the confession was
taken in violation of the due process clause of the constitution.
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It is of interest to compare this case with the McNabb and Anderson
cases, which arose in the federal courts, because in the Ashcraft case which
arose in a state court, the confession was ruled out on the due process clause
of the 14th amendment to the constitution, whereas in the McNabb and
Anderson cases the confessions were ruled out on procedural grounds under
the general supervisory power of the U. S. Supreme Court over inferior
federal courts. However, in all of the cases reversed the factual background
indicates that the court thought in each case the confession of the arrested
person had been induced by questioning while being illegally detained too long.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 5
required that an officer making an arrest with or without a warrant shall
take the arrested person "without unnecessary delay before the nearest avali-
able commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States." About
all rule 5 did was to substitute the words "without unnecessary delay" for
the language used in the "prompt production statutes" which were then in
force with reference to the various agencies of the U. S. government.
For -instance, before rule 5 was enacted, by section 595, title 18, U. S.
C. A., it was the duty of the marshal or other officer to "take the arrested
person before the nearest U. S. commissioner or the nearest judicial officer
having jurisdiction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment or taking
bail for trial," the statute not expressly stating any temporal element.
In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, title 5, U. S. C. A.,
section 300(a), imposed the duty when an arrest is without a warrant, to
take the person arrested "immediately" before a committing officer. Another
special statute concerning the arrest of persons operating illicit distilleries
required arraignment "forthwith." Statutes governing the police officers of
the District of Columbia required police officers to take a person arrested
without a warrant "immediately and without delay" before the proper court.
However, even with rule 5, which, as stated substituted the words "without
unnecessary delay" for the "prompt production statutes," we are still con-
fronted with a disputed problem on which there is a sharp clash between
those who stand for efficient law enforcement and those who are jealous 6f
the rights and liberty of the individual, all of which has resulted in many
proposals for corrective legislation or rules.
At the moment there is pending before Congress, House Resolution No. 4
entitled "A Bill to Safeguard the Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases,"
a full text of which is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that no law as to the
time within which a person under arrest must be brought before a
magistrate, commissioner, or court, shall render inadmissible any evidence
that is otherwise admissible.
The purpose of this, as is plainly evident, is specifically to overrule the
McNabb decision and override the "prompt production" rules. This resolu-
tion passed the House on February 24, 1947, and was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on February 26, 1947, and has not yet been reported
out of the committee.
I have been unable to find any United States law authorizing a prisoner
to be detained for the purpose of investigation, or, stated in another way,
the law does not permit investigatory imprisonment. We all know it has
been a common practice for police officers, sheriffs, et cetera, to book suspects
for investigation and such procedure by police and sheriffs has resulted in
the detection of crime which would otherwise have been overlooked. For,
tunately our federal practice has been reasonably free of such conduct.
It should therefore be a matter of grave concern to the bar when enforce-
ment officers contend that they cannot protect society and enforce the law
efficiently without violating the law themselves. Something is wrong with
a system where officials feel that the only way to protect society is by a
course of conduct contrary to the law itself. Under present law we demand
that the officer bring the prisoner without unnecessary delay before a U. S.
commissioner and then, in the next breath, we say that if you fail to do so
absolutely nothing will happen to you or your work if you keep a prisoner
incommunicado as long as you please, except, in the event you obtain a con-
fession from him it will be ruled out of the evidence which of course does
no harm to the officer himself but only society suffers by freeing in most
instances a guilty person.
There are those who contend that where the officer illegally detains an
arrested person and a confession which otherwise in all respects is voluntary
and has indications of truthfulness, is obtained, it should be admissible in
evidence and the officer himself punished for the illegal detention. On the
other hand there are those who say that punishment of the officer will inter-
fere with the officer's eagerness to enforce the law. The still further argument
is advanced that to quibble around or, during the course of a trial to discipline
an officer for -illegal detention with reference to a confession, has a tendency
to distract the jury from the main issue-the guilt or innocence of the accused
-and emphasize the misconduct of the officer.
Should we, therefore, have some definite time limit for the arraignment
of an arrested person before a committing magistrate? If so, what should
the time limit be?
There have been cases where the officers contend they were justified in
detaining the arrested person for long periods of time. For instance, in the
case of United States v. Haupt, 136 Fed. (2d) 661, Haupt was detained,
and illegally so the appellate court held, for a period of about thirty days
without arraignment, but if he had been arraigned it would have been a
warning to eight saboteurs who would have escaped'in a time of emergency.
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Then there are gang kidnapping cases where prompt arraignment of one of
the arrested kidnappers would permit warning to the other kidnappers and
deprive the officers of valuable information which they might have obtained
by way of interrogation. If we would endeavor to set a time limit, say of
eight days, what, then, are we going to do with reference to protecting the
prisoner's liberties? After all, under our law a man is presumed to be in-
nocent until proven guilty. Imagine an innocent person being shut up for
eight days in a cell or hotel room incommunicado by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. This would be permitting the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to convict anybody they please and sentence them to solitary confinement for
eight days except for the occasional companionship of the officers themselves.
This no doubt would be unsatisfactory.
Our own circuit court in Ruhl v. United States, 148 Fed. (2d) 173,
speaking through Judge Huxman, held that "no hard or fast rule can be laid
down by which the admissibility of a confession may be determined with
finality in every case. Every confession must be viewed in the light of all
the surrounding facts and circumstances. It should be upheld only when it
can be said from such an examination that it was given freely and voluntarily,
and without threats, compulsion or use of force."
In using the language, "Every confession must be viewed in the light
of all the surrounding facts and circumstances," did our circuit court have
in mind to review whether there was prompt arraignment or illegal detention,
and whether counsel and an immediate hearing on the existence of probable
cause, were afforded the accused, or only to examine the confession as to its
voluntariness?
Must the public and the law enforcement officers await the slow case-
by-case processes of the court for a determination of this problem, or should
we have legislation permitting, on proper showing to a judicial magistrate,
the issuance of a warrant, or upon probable cause, the arrest without a
warrant, of a person for investigatory imprisonment? Or, on the other hand,
should we have legislation, as we now have in some states (laws which are
universally disregarded) punishing officers for illegal detention and pro-
longed, exhaustive, secret interrogation? Or should such misconduct by an
officer be punished, as for contempt, by the courts?
It certainly is a situation to demand the attention of every lawyer and
the primary purpose of this presentation is to intensify your interest and point
out for your concern the seriousness of this clash between civil liberties, on
the one hand, and efficient law enforcement on the other. What do you think




WARREN B. HALE, formerly justice of the peace in Denver, has resigned from
that position and opened an office for the general practice of law at 322
Patterson Bldg., Denver.
GORSUCH AND KIRGIS have moved their offices to 222 Equitable Bldg., Denver.
John E. Gorsuch, Frederic L. Kirgis, Leonard M. Campbell, Roscoe Walker,
Jr., and James B. Day are the attorneys in the office.
CHARLES W. SHELDON, JR., formerly assistant counsel of the Capitol Life
Insurance Company has opened his office for the general practice at 235
Equitable Bldg., Denver.
TRUMAN A. STOCKTON, JR., has moved his offices to 1650 Grant St., Denver.
ARTHUR EVERETT SMALL, JR., a newly admitted member of the bar, offices
with him.
THOMAS E. BOYLES, former assistant city attorney, has become associated with
Thurmon and Gregory, 104 Broadway, Denver.
RICHARD TULL has become associated with Dudley and Jerome Strickland in
the firm of Strickland,' Strickland and Tull, with offices at 425 Denver Na-
tional Bank Bldg., Denver. The firm was founded by the late D. W. Strick-
land.
P. H. LAMPHERE and H. B. VAN VALKENBURGH III have announced the
formation of the firm of Lamphere and Van Valkenburgh, for the exclusive
practice of patent, trade-mark, copyright and unfair competition law. Mr.
Lamphere is an electrical engineering graduate of the University of Idaho, and
received his law degree from George Washington University. He was a
former examiner in the patent office, and practised patent law in St. Louis,
Mo., for over thirteen years prior to coming to Denver in 1944. While in St.
Louis, he was associated with the firm of Kingsland, Rogers and Ezell, now
Rogers and Ezell, Mr. Kingsland having been recently apponted Commissioner
of Patents. Mr. Lamphere is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia,
Missouri and Colorado. Mr. Van Valkenburgh is a mechanical engineering
graduate of the University of Colorado, and after serving for two years as a
student engineer with the General Electric Co., returned to the University of
Colorado to obtain an M.S. degree, majoring in mechanical engineering. He
obtained his law degree at New York University, and served for eight years
as a patent attorney in the patent department of Union Carbide and Carbon
Corp. in New York, prior to returning to Colorado in 1943. He is a member
of the bars of New York and Colorado. The new firm will have its offices
in the First National Bank Bldg., Denver.
